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GUNTHER TEUBNER* & ANNA BECKERS**
I. NEW CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS
Therefore pass these Sirens by, and stop your men's ears
with wax that none of them may hear; but if you like you
can listen yourself, for you may get the men to bind you
as you stand upright on a cross-piece half way up the
mast, and they must lash the rope's ends to the mast
itself, that you may have the pleasure of listening. If you
beg and pray the men to unloose you, then they must
bind you faster.'
With these words, Homer tells us in the Odyssey that the beautiful
witch-goddess Circe warned Ulysses against the Sirens. Sirens were
dangerous creatures, beautiful bird-like seductresses who lured nearby
sailors with their enchanting music and voices to shipwreck on the
rocky coast of their island. But with cunning obedience, Ulysses
followed Circe's advice. Tying his hands to the mast, he not only saved
his ship from wreckage but also could listen joyfully to the sirens'
singing without falling for their deadly temptation. We can not only
achieve sheer survival but also higher degrees of freedom through
intelligent self-restraint. Freedom through self-restraint is Ulysses'
constitutional message.
Jon Elster applies Ulysses' constitutional message to the individual
rational actor. He criticizes the notion of rationality using economics, a
discipline concerned with maximizing the satisfaction of agents' present
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1. HOMER, ODYSSEE bk. XII (Samuel Butler trans., 1900) (Ancient Greece n.d.),
available at http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/homer/ody/odyl2.htm.
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preferences. 2 Individual freedom through self-restraint means avoiding
"irrational" desires.3
But Ulysses' message is relevant not only for the individual.
Instead, it concerns the constitution of the crew, the ship, and the
collective enterprise of the Odyssey. In this collective dimension, Homer
anticipates one of the strangest phenomenon which emerged in the
modern nation-states' political constitutions. The deadly temptations of
power cannot be overcome by external restraints; instead, power needs
to restrain itself. Self-limitations of power-here lies the historical
success of nation-state constitutions: checks and balances; division of
powers; procedural constraints on decisions; constitutional rights; and,
more recently, Ewigkeitsklausel (eternity clauses), which block the
democratic majority from abolishing human rights and democracy.
However, if we look closer to the situation, we realize that there are
many sirens attacking Ulysses' ship. The great error of state centrism in
constitutional theory and practice is that it only addresses one
temptation. Concentrating on the excesses of state power meant turning
a blind eye to the manifold other sirenic temptations. Not only
Thelxiepeia, but also Molpe, Aglaophonos, Peisithoe, Parthenope,
Ligeia, Leucosia, Raidne, and Teles try to lure Ulysses' crew with their
seductive voices. Similarly, constitutional dangers are not only created
by power but also by money, knowledge, technology, and medicine.
Today, the great constitutional conflicts are not only about the state
constitution but also about the many constitutions within global society.
The battlefields are the global constitution of the finance economy, of
science and technology, and of the new digital media.4 Postmodern
society is exposed to expansive, even totalitarian, tendencies of a variety
of partial rationalities: monetarization, commodification, scientification,
juridification, and medicalization. This is where Michel Foucault's
"capillary power" creeps in from the different disciplines within society,
not just from the old "capital power" of the state.5 It finds its
constitutional reaction in Jacques Derrida's concept of the "capillary
constitutions" within the many discourses in society.6
To be more concrete: during the last few years, a series of public
scandals have raised the "new constitutional question." Multinational
corporations have violated human rights; the World Trade
2. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY (1979).
3. See id.
4. For a monograph treatment, see generally GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL
FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION (2012).
5. IICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 198 (1995).
6. Id.; JACQUES DERRIDA, LAUTRE CAP [THE OTHER HEADING] 44 (1991) (Fr.).
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Organization's decisions have endangered the environment and human
health in the name of global free trade; there has been doping in sport;
there has been corruption in medicine and science; private
intermediaries have threatened freedom of conscience on the Internet;
there have been massive invasions of privacy through data collection by
private organizations; and global capital markets have unleashed
catastrophic risks. Each of these scandals poses questions of external
regulation and the internal constitution of these social sectors.
Where exactly lies the constitutional challenge beyond the
nation-state? Homer tells us the Sirens' temptation lies in what we
would call collective addiction. As Walter Copland Perry observed:
"Their song, though irresistibly sweet, was no less sad than sweet, and
lapped both body and soul in a fatal lethargy, the forerunner of death
and corruption."7 The sirens' irresistible temptation to perform social
activities in spite of self-damaging consequences is not only individual
but also predominantly social. It is the temptation of the whole crew
sailing toward the riffs. Social addiction remains forever and cannot be
healed, but it may be domesticated by constitutional self-restraints.
Societal constitutionalism asks for the collective redefinition of
individual addiction--compulsive engagement in an activity despite
lasting negative consequences-to be rethought for social systems in
general and for collective actors in particular. Which "addiction
mechanisms" are responsible for the fact that the autopoietic
self-reproduction of several social sectors through the recursivity of
system-specific operations reverts into a communicative compulsion to
repetition and growth, bringing self-destructive consequences in its
wake?
There is nothing necessary about the catastrophe and about Max
Weber's "iron cage" of modernity.8 The occurrence of catastrophe is
contingent. It depends on whether countervailing structures will emerge
that prevent the positive feedback catastrophe. The "constitutional
moment" is not the moment when the self-destructive dynamic makes
the abstract danger of a collapse appear. Rather, it is the moment when
the collapse is directly imminent. It is not yet Circe warning Ulysses,
but it is the imminent arrival of the Sirens when the deadly danger of
the birds strikes. This is the moment of crisis in the collective addiction:
the moment where collective energies are released. It is the moment
when Ulysses' cunning strategy of self-binding actually works.
7. Walter Copland Perry, The Sirens in Ancient Literature and Art, THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY, July-Dec. 1883, at 117.
8. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1402 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Ephraim Fischoff trans., Univ. Cal. Press, 4th ed. 1978) (1922).
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In the self-energizing processes of maximizing subrationalities,
self-correction is only possible at the very last minute. The similarity
with individual addiction therapies is obvious: Hit the bottom! It must
be one minute before midnight. Only then does today's addictive society
have a chance of self-correction. Only then is the understanding lucid
enough, the suffering severe enough, and the will to change strong
enough to allow a radical change of course.
Societal constitutionalism identifies those constitutional moments in
politics. One moment was in 1945 when the United Nations Declaration
of Human Rights was accepted worldwide after the atrocities of
totalitarian regimes. In functional differentiation, all subsystems of
society develop massive growth energies that are excessively ambiguous
in their productivity and in their destructiveness. But constitutional
moments also occur in many sites of global society. We have experienced
constitutional moments in the global economy. Some global
constitutional moments happened in 1929 and 2008 when the collapse of
powerful banks triggered social movements for a worldwide financial
constitution. Recently, science and technology had their constitutional
moment in 2011 when the Fukushima disaster signaled the limits to
nuclear industry. Even the so-called humanistic discipline of medicine
experienced its moment in 1943 when Dr. Mengele performed human
experiments on concentration camp inmates, including children. And we
are waiting for the constitutional moment to occur in the digital world.
Google and Facebook's data manipulations sound like early warnings.
Exogenous self-binding was Ulysses' constitutional strategy.
Obviously this is a paradox. How did he overcome the paradox of the
internal self-binding of the sovereign's will triggered from the outside? A
twofold externalization shows the way out for constitutionalism. Circe's
magic authority created external learning pressures for Ulysses'
self-restraint, and when he delegated the bindingness of his promise to
the crew, he blocked his own urges to unbind himself from his
pre-commitment. 9
II. CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT: AN EXAMPLE OF SOCIETAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Following the metaphor of Ulysses, twofold externalization
combined with internal self-reflection are the fundamental prerequisites
to productively transform the experience of crisis into a constitutional
moment. This constitutional moment then may give rise to a stable
societal constitution for the regime, network, organization, or system-
9. See HOMER, supra note 1, bk. XII.
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in the following generally social sector-at stake. To be sure, the theory
of societal constitutionalism does not explicitly rely on an intrinsic,
voluntary motivation of social sectors to enter into a self-limiting
process. Conversely, predicting that these rules on self-limitation are
developed voluntarily would imply a false idealism and would
overestimate the potential of self-regulation to solve such constitutional
conflicts. Although the social sector is the only competent authority to
introduce self-limitations, realistically, it is often not willing to do so.10
Faced with this competence-motivation dilemma, the catastrophe is
both pivotal and inevitable. The important question is then: How could
the moment of catastrophe, where the self-destructive consequences of
the own operations become existential, push the sector into a
constitutional process? The theory of societal constitutionalism suggests
that what is needed is sufficient external pressure that triggers a
process of internal self-reflection, which is subsequently externally
stabilized." Pressure, internal self-constraint, and external stabilization
are thus the key components that make societal constitutions possible.12
A. Pressure Against Growth Tendencies: NGOs, Consumers, Politics,
and Law
The first important condition for a constitutional moment is
accordingly sufficient pressure that calls for self-limitation. Only strong
external and internal pressures allow societies to overcome the
competence-motivation dilemma and "force" the social sector into a
self-restricting process. Such pressure may come from the outside-
social movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), media, and
intellectuals-and from the inside-consumer and investor pressure in
the economy, shareholder activism, or users contesting against Internet
intermediaries. 13 Yet, in addition, political intervention by means of
regulation and legal liability may become external pressures.1 4
10. With respect to corporations, similar observations have been made already by Neil
Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An institutional perspective, 19
LAw & Soc'y 363, 390 (1997) ("A useful starting point is to recognize that there is
commonly a substantial gap between the self-interest of an industry or an individual
enterprise, and that of the public ... Where a large gap does indeed exist, then it would be
naive . . . to rely upon an individual enterprise or industry association taking steps
voluntarily in the public interest").
11. For these elements as pivotal conditions for societal constitutionalism extensively,
see TEUBNER, supra note 4, at ch. IV.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 84.
14. Id.
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Consider the codes of conduct developed by multinationals that
contain explicit commitments to respect fundamental human rights,
workplace standards, the rights of local communities and indigenous
people, and the natural environment. The development of these codes
reveals how strong pressure generated on multinational corporations
with the objective of criticizing the negative effects of their worldwide
operation proved to be very influential. It is also an example where the
influence of different forms of pressure can be observed. The first codes
of conduct-Levi Strauss in 1992 and shortly thereafter Nike-came out
of the scandalization processes initiated by NGOs and transported
through the media.15 Moreover, the vast majority of corporate codes of
conduct dealing with labor standards were enacted at the turn of the
century. 16 At this time, the famous "No Logo" campaign and the
Anti-Sweatshop movement were at their peak in receiving wide public
attention. 17
Next to external pressure by NGOs, the internal reaction on the
market was important. In this regard, consumers and investors in the
last decade have paid increasing attention to the social and
environmental performance of corporations instead of just the price and
quality of provided goods and services.1 8 For example, the FairTrade
Labelling Organization, an umbrella NGO that certifies products that
are manufactured or grown under fair labor conditions, observed
roughly a triplication in sales of certified products between 1997 and
15. For the interaction of codes of conduct and civil society pressure, see generally
Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law:
The New Corporate Accountability, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 9, 14-17 (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007). For
detailed analyses with respect to different companies, see, for example, VIRGINIA
HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 58-69 (2001) (apparel industry); Larry CatA Backer, Economic
Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart
as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739 (2007) (retail industry); Philip H. Mirvis,
Transformation at Shell: Commerce and Citizenship, 105 BUS. & SocY REV. 63 (2000) (oil
industry).
16. For an overview of the corporate codes development in the 1990s, see, for example,
Ans Kolk & Rob Van Tulder, Setting new global rules? TNCs and Codes of Conduct, 14
TRANSNAT'L CORPS., no. 3, at 1, 6-7 (2005); Fabrizio Marrella, Human Rights, Arbitration,
and Corporate Social Responsibility in the Law of International Trade, in ECONOMIC
GLOBALISATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 266, 294-95 (Wolfgang Benedek et. al. eds., 2007).
17. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES (2000)
(discussing the impact of brand-name culture in the global economy and the cultural
backlash that has developed in response).
18. For a monograph treatment of this changing demand structure on the market, see
generally NICO STEHR, MORAL MARKETS: HOW KNOWLEDGE AND AFFLUENCE CHANGE
CONSUMERS AND PRODUCTS (2008). An overview of different empirical studies on this
phenomenon is provided by DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE 47 (2005).
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2003.19 Interestingly, such internal pressure does not only derive from
consumers or private investors: in the area of public procurement, there
is also evidence of how governments more frequently include social and
environmental standards as a requirement in their public procurement
contracts, and, in so doing, make environmental or social performance
part of the contractual obligations. 20
A result of this strong pressure was that corporations exposed to
public criticism began to sense the negative side effects of their
worldwide operation as serious risks for their reputation and as having
a potential negative impact on sales.21 From their perspective, the
changing expectations of customers and investors became a core reason
for adapting a more responsive attitude towards respect for human
rights and environmental matters. The critique on the codes as
mechanisms primarily working in relation to brand-sensitive and
consumer-dependent industries seems to underline this correlation
rather than question it.22
Against this background, codes of conduct can in fact be understood
partly as a reaction to constant pressure from NGOs and the market
rather than a result of voluntary motivation. But why does societal
constitutionalism understand this pressure merely as a factor for
initiating a process of self-limitation instead of arguing for direct
political intervention? Critics would rightly insist that past experience
shows that self-limitation following societal pressure inevitably leads to
new excesses and escape from effective self-limitation. In the example of
19. FAIRTRADE LABELLING ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2003/04:
SHOPPING FOR A BETTER WORLD 3, http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user-upload/content
/AR_03-04_screenfinal-1.pdf.
20. For the relevance of public bodies that pressure corporations into adopting social
and environmental standards, see generally Christopher McCrudden, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Public Procurement, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY:
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW, supra note 15. For the permission of
including noneconomic considerations in tender procedures pursuant to public
procurement laws in general, see, for example, C-31/87, Beentjes BV v. Netherlands, 1988
E.C.R. 4635; C-255/98, Comm'n v. France, 2000 E.C.R. 1-7445; C-513/99, Concordia Bus
Finland, 2002 E.C.R. 1-7213; C-448/01, EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Republik
Osterreich, 2003 E.C.R. 1-14527; c.f. C-368/10 Comm'n v. Netherlands (2012) (not yet
published in the official journal) (restricting public authorities from only procuring
products with a specific label, in this case a label that complies with the Fair Trade
Labelling Organization).
21. VOGEL, supra note 18, at 52.
22. For this criticism, see, for example, RHYS JENKINS, UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH
INST. FOR Soc. DEY., CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT: SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 27 (2001); Doreen McBarnet & Marina Kurkchiyan, Corporate Social
Responsibility Through Contractual Control? Global Supply Chains and "Other
Regulation", in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW, supra note 15, at 59, 83-84.
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codes of conduct, this concern reveals itself in the ongoing criticism on
the vague and unenforceable character of the codes: the codes are seen
as an example of how corporations react to social pressure by adopting
vague policy statements that only imitate regulation.23 Consequently, it
is external regulation instead of internal codes of conduct that is called
for.
Indeed, the claim for external regulation seems plausible, but only
at first sight. Past experience has equally shown how in many cases
attempts to control internal processes through external intervention
failed due to the lack of knowledge and competence of external
authorities.24 And regulatory initiatives were also regularly criticized
because of their inherent limited reach, allowing corporations to identify
potential gaps and thus circumventing regulatory intervention. If this
experience is also taken into consideration, it becomes indeed difficult to
fall back on the familiar concept of political-legal intervention. But how
can we then still make sense of politics and law in the theory of societal
constitutionalism?
Homer gives some hints on that. Although not being competent to
order the sailors or being present in the situation where the deadly
temptation arose, Circe-the magic authority-remained important.
She advised Ulysses on how to pass by the Island of Sirens. What can be
learned from this metaphor? Firstly, only those being competent and
having the situational knowledge can initiate the process of
self-limitation. The closure of transnational corporations is, in fact, a
serious hindrance that prevents politics and law from effective
intervention.25 Hence, a process of internal self-reflection may be more
powerful than any external intervention because it directly reaches the
core of the corporation and may there lead to long-term changes. Yet,
this is not a claim for deregulation and liberalization, as
23. See, e.g., JENKINS, supra note 22; John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human
Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 489-90
(1999); Eva Kocher, Corporate Social Responsibility: Eine gelungene Inszenierung?, 43
KRITISCHE JUSTIz 29, 30-31 (2010). For a critique on the specific vagueness regarding the
rights to collective bargaining and freedom of association in corporate codes of conduct, see
Adelle Blackett, Codes of Corporate Conduct and the Labour Regulatory State in
Developing Countries, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAw: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 121, 126-28 (John J. Kirton & Michael J.
Trebilcock eds., 2004).
24. The failure of controlling private actors by external regulation has already been
observed by others. See John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for
Corproate Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466, 1466-67 (1982); Anthony Ogus,
Rethinking Self-Regulation, 15 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 97, 97-98 (1995); Gunningham & Rees,
supra note 10.
25. See NIKLAs LUHMANN, ORGANISATION UND ENTSCHEIDUNG [ORGANIZATION AND
DECISION] 39-79 (2000) (describing organizations as operationally closed systems) (Ger.).
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institutionalized politics and law also play an indispensable role.
External guidelines and regulatory intervention may generate massive
pressure on the social sector.
The influence of institutionalized politics can at least be considered
partly successful in reaching corporations. That codes of conduct are
merely "lip-services" without binding effect might have been true for the
first generation of the codes. However, the ongoing public critique on the
codes forced corporations to revise and improve their codes. 26 This is
also the moment where politics began to play a crucial role. In order to
avoid further public exposure, corporations increasingly orientated their
codes on national and international standards by adhering to guidelines
enacted by international political organizations such as the United
Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), or the International Labour Organization (ILO). In several
sectors, the international standards laid down in the conventions of the
ILO are quite commonly dealt with in the codes of conduct. 27 In
addition, corporations investing in foreign countries attempt to draft
their codes with due consideration to the technical or environmental
standards of their home country. The German chemical industry, for
instance, imposed internal environmental standards on their
subsidiaries in foreign direct investment by transforming the standards
constituted in German environmental law. The higher home country
standards were integrated into the production process, but they were
adjusted to the technical production specifics and the legal and technical
situation in the host country. 28 The application of international and
national regulatory standards has indeed shown how regulatory efforts
26. An instructive example of how external pressure can lead to improvements of the
codes is provided by Larry CatA Backer in this volume. See generally Larry Cat6 Backer,
Transnational Corporations' Outward Expression of Inward Self-Constitution: The
Enforcement of Human Rights by Apple, Inc., 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 805 (2013).
27. See generally Gare Smith & Dan Feldman, World Bank Group, Apparel, Footwear
and Light Manufacturing, Agribusiness, Tourism, in 1 COMPANY CODES OF CONDUCT AND
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: AN ANALYTICAL COMPARISON (2003) (empirical studies on
content of codes of conduct); see also, McBarnet & Kurkchiyan, supra note 22, at 66
('Though the ethical supply codes of different companies express their requirements in
variety of way, their labour requirements in particular tend to echo international law and
norms, effectively reproducing the fundamental principles espoused by the International
Labour Organisation.") (discussing British multinationals); Louise Vytopil, Contractual
Control and Labour-Related CSR Norms in the Supply Chain: Dutch Best Practices, 8
UTRECHT L. REV. 155, 166 (2012) (discussing Dutch multinationals).
28. MARTIN HERBERG, GLOBALISIERUNG UND PRIVATE SELBSTREGULIERUNG:
UMWELTSCHUTZ IN MULTINATIONALEN UNTERNEHMEN [GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATE
SELF-REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES] 184-94
(2007) (Ger.).
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by national governments and international organizations may be
strongly relevant for the further development of the codes.
The influence of the law should equally not be underestimated. By
aiming at holding corporations liable for socially or environmentally
irresponsible behavior, lawsuits against corporations have become an
effective strategy to channel social pressure and initiate changes in the
corporate organization. 29 For a long time, the most prominent example
has in this regard been the U.S. Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA) that
civil society groups used in order to haul companies before courts for
violating international ius cogens norms.30 Although the success of this
strategy is now significantly restricted due to the very recent Supreme
Court decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,31 there are still
numerous strategies that are tested by civil society groups and victims
to hold corporations liable for extraterritorial violations of human rights
or environmental standards.32 Foreign Direct Liability litigation can be
mentioned as an important example. 33 Such lawsuits against
multinationals have become powerful instances in different respects.
As legal proceedings are dealt with in the media, litigation first
intensifies negative publicity. Companies in the extractive industries,
for instance, do only to a limited extent serve the consumer market;
accordingly, one may be tempted to assume that they would be more
immune against the external pressures from consumers. However, this
sector turned out to be more often comparably affected by tort law
claims by victims, with the result of also being subject to public
exposure and their negative effects on the environment and the local
communities being revealed. 34 Besides negative publicity and possible
29. For the influence of the legal system on corporations, see, for example, McBarnet,
supra note 15, at 38-39 ("Corporate Responsibility through law').
30. See Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the
Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibiilty, 38 L. & Soc'Y REV. 635, 655-59
(2004) (explaining ATCA litigation and its importance for pressuring corporations into
self-regulatory programs).
31. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 133 S.Ct. 1649 (2013). See also Balintulo v.
Daimler AG, No. 09-2778-cv(L), 2013 WL 4437057 (2nd Cir. Aug. 21, 2013).
32. See Corporate Legal Accountability Portal, Bus. & HUM. RTs. RES. CTR.,
http://www.business-humanrights.org/LegalPortal/Home (last visited May 30, 2013)
(providing an overview and summaries of lawsuits against multinational corporations).
33. For an extensive analysis of this strategy, see LISBETH ENNEKING, FOREIGN DIRECT
LIABILITY AND BEYOND. EXPLORING THE ROLE OF TORT LAW IN PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2012).
34. See Jonathan Drimmer, Human Rights and the Extractive Industries: Litigation
and Compliance Trends, 3 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUs. 121, 123-31 (2010) ("While more
than two dozen companies have been targeted in these human rights actions ... no sector
has been more targeted by human rights lawsuits in US courts than the extractive
industry.") (discussing ATCA litigation against the extractive industries).
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reputation damages, legal proceedings against corporations contain high
financial risks for companies as the high settlement payments in
previous cases show.35 Yet, the effect of lawsuits against multinationals
can certainly not be limited to reputational and financial risks. Human
rights litigation against corporations is a pivotal means to concretize
and channel social expectations and force corporations to investigate
whether their existing self-limitative measures are in fact sufficient. In
the words of an observer:
Human Rights have been on the CSR agenda for some
time, and it has become routine practice for
multinationals to sign up to voluntary human rights
commitments such as the UN's Global Compact, and to
include respect for human rights in their own codes of
conduct. But the use of ATCA by NGOs has made it
clear to multinationals that commitment without
compliance is not enough.36
These examples show that the use of codes of conduct as potentially
self-limitative rules did not evolve solely as a matter of corporate
self-regulation. In fact, the pressure by civil society, the market,
political guidance, and the legal system were pivotal to give rise to the
codes. Societal constitutional processes are accordingly only successful if
they are initiated by a sufficiently large degree of pressure stemming
from civil society, media, politics, and the law.
B. Internal Self-Reflection: Codes of Conduct as Part of Corporate
Constitutionalism
Yet, as has been mentioned above, societal constitutionalism still
requires the social sector to build up internal workable self-limitations.
Reflection can certainly be stimulated from the outside, but can never
be replaced by it. This is because the instances putting pressure on
companies lack the exact knowledge about workable and effective
self-limiting measures. Transforming external pressure into internal
self-reflection, rather, requires a new form of sensitivity of the social
sector in which the pressures trigger a "cognitive learning" process. 37
35. See id. at 130-31 (discussing the financial outcome of ATCA litigation in the
extractive industry).
36. McBarnet, supra note 15, at 39.
37. TEUBNER, supra note 4, at 94-95.
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While human rights, workplace standards, and environmental
protection were initiated due to constant external and internal pressure,
the exact functioning of the codes, however, had to take place internally.
The corporation is the only institution capable of regulating its own
organizational structures and processes, the operation abroad, and the
relations with contractual partners. The content of the codes and the
institutions monitoring performance have to match the specifics of each
of the affected sectors. Companies in industries that operate with a
huge network of suppliers, such as garment or electronics, are
particularly vulnerable to the violations of labor standards at their
suppliers' factories, as the discussions on Nike or more recently Apple
show. The extractive industries are particularly confronted with specific
aspects of technical safety and the risk of environmental pollution that
affect the rights of local communities. Bhopal, or, more recently, BP in
the Gulf of Mexico gained notoriety as catastrophes where the relevance
of these issues became apparent.3 8 It is therefore no coincidence that
codes of conduct evolved in labor-intensive industries as supplier codes
of conduct with a strong emphasis on workplace standards and labor
rights, while the codes in extractive industries developed as corporate
policy statements and internal safety guidelines with a focus on
environmental pollution, technical safety, and local community
impact.39
Yet, the knowledge required is not sector specific. To provide an
example, Martin Herberg conducted an empirical study on the
environmental programs of large corporations in the chemical industry
and great differences in the individual companies' steering mechanisms,
38. Such differences between sectors as to their human rights impacts have also been
emphasized by JOHN RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 22-26 (2013) ("Not surprisingly, the footwear and apparel industry tends
to have a greater impact on workers than on communities, while the extractive industry
has a large impact on communities as well").
39. See generally Dirk Holtbrtigge & Nicola Berg, Menschenrechte und
Verhaltenskodizes in multinationalen Unternehmen [Human Rights and Codes of Conduct
in Multinational Companies], in MENSCHEN- UND BORGERRECHTE: IDEENGESCHICHTE UND
INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN [HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF IDEAS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] 81 (Petra Bendel & Thomas Fischer eds., 2004) (Ger.). For the
focus of labor-intensive industries such as apparel, footwear, sportswear, or agribusiness
on labor rights, see Kolk & Van Tulder, supra note 16, at 7. For the significantly lower
standards regarding labor issues in the oil and gas sector and the specific focus of their
codes on health and safety standards and environmental management systems, see Gare
Smith & Dan Feldman, World Bank Group, Oil and Gas, Mining, in 2 COMPANY CODES OF
CONDUCT AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: AN ANALYTICAL COMPARISON 5-21 (2004)
("Unlike the footwear and apparel or agribusiness industry sectors profiled in Part I, there
is not the same degree of conformity among extractive companies in prohibiting the use of
forced labor or child labor').
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the way environmental objectives in foreign direct investment are
realized, and the way environmental objectives are monitored. His
analysis reveals that external recommendations, such as the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) environmental
management systems, were revised and made more concrete, rather
than strictly implemented, in order to fit in the specific organizational
structure of each individual corporation as well as the legal and cultural
situation in the host country. 40
By the same token, supplier codes of conduct have to be adjusted to
the particular legal, economic, and cultural situation of the country in
which suppliers operate. A common problem is the right to collective
bargaining, which is prohibited in some countries, such as China. 41 If
local law proscribes worker councils or trade unions, corporations would
have to find other mechanisms to give effect to such rights without
violating their own standards or violating national law.42 In addition to
local specifics, the functioning of the codes depends to a high degree on
the particular relation of the corporation with its supplier. As empirical
studies on working conditions at supplier factories observe, a code of
conduct as such cannot abolish unacceptable working conditions. The
codes lead to significant improvements of workplace standards only if
they are implemented into the core business operation, adjusted to the
specific situation of the supplier, supervised by the corporate center,
and based on a collaborative relationship with the supplier.43
Hence, the knowledge of how to implement effective self-limitative
rules lies hidden in the corporation itself. Societal pressure is then
relevant for activating this knowledge. Subsequent internal
self-reflection may become an effective internal limitation resulting in
higher responsiveness to its social, human, and ecological environment.
40. HERBERG, supra note 28, at 127-33.
41. Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Accountability Standards in the Global Supply
Chain: Resistance, Reconsideration and Resolution in China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 321, 336-37 (2007).
42. See McBarnet & Kurkchiyan, supra note 22, at 71 (identifying different strategies
by corporations) ("In such cases, interviewees [corporate managers, the authors] reported,
suppliers are still encouraged by the purchasing company to initiate some kind of workers'
representative body that can operate with the consent of the management and consult
with it about the running of the business . . . An alternative, or supplementary
strategy . . . is for companies to tackle this issue through political rather than contractual
influence, working at the macro rather than the micro level, by engaging in a lobbying
campaign through the Ethical Trade Organisation to change local law.").
43. See, e.g., Stephen Frenkel & Duncan Scott, Compliance, Collaboration, and Codes
of Labor Practice: The Adidas Connection, 45 CAL. MGMT. REV. 29, 43-44 (2002)
(discussing the implementation of a labor code at Adidas corporation); Richard M. Locke et
al., Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards? Lessons from Nike, 35-39 (Mass. Inst.
Tech. Sloan Sch. Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4612-06, 2006).
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Societal constitutionalism, however, remains realistic in that respect;
not every process of self-reflection results in effective self-limitation.
The large number of multinational corporations that have either vague
codes of conduct 44 or no code at all 45 provide evidence for this.
And since there is no external knowledge on how these
self-limitations will look for each of the social sectors at stake, there is
only the possibility of experimenting with this peculiar relation between
external pressure and internal self-reflection. Political-legal regulation
and societal pressure are indeed unavoidable, but this pressure does not
guarantee a transformation into the desired constitutional process.
There is no alternative except to experiment with social pressure and
with the possibilities of self-limitation.
C. Candidates for External Stabilization: Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives
and National Courts
However, even a successful self-limitation alone is not sufficient. It
must be externally stabilized. The paradox of exogenous
self-binding-the will to be bound against one's will-has to be met. In
other words: How can self-limitation be upheld even when the
experience of danger fades and temptation becomes overwhelming?
Ulysses met this paradox by ordering his sailors' to disobey his will and
leave him tied to the mast regardless of how much he would beg for
release.
In relation to societal constitutionalism, it is-as a
third claim-argued that self-limitation must be backed up by external
constraints. 46 Experience with political constitutions shows how the
paradox of self-binding has been externalized to the law. The
nation-state constitution is not solely an instance of self-limitation of
the political system, but also connected to the self-reflexive process of
the law:47 "'Constitution' can be reduced neither to a legal phenomenon
44. See, e.g., Vytopil, supra note 27, at 165-66 (conducting an empirical study on the
content of codes of conduct in the sixteen largest Dutch corporations where almost thirty
percent of the codes were classified as "weak," meaning codes containing vague phrasing,
no reference to any external standards, no monitoring mechanisms, and no signature of
the supplier).
45. McBarnet & Kurkchiyan, supra note 22, at 83.
46. TEUBNER, supra note 4, at 102-10.
47. See generally Niklas Luhmann, Verfassung als evolutionfire Errungenschaft
[Constitution as Evolutionary Achievement], 9 RECHTSHISTORISCHES J. [JOURNAL FOR
HISTORY OF LAW] 176 (1990) (describing the constitution as a structural coupling between
politics and law) (Ger.).
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nor to a social phenomenon. It is always a double phenomenon, a linking
of two actual processes." 48
Translated into the concrete example discussed here, the code of
conduct, in order to become a societal constitution, does then not only
have to serve as the organizing principle of the corporation, but it also
needs to be connected to and stabilized by a legal process. A stable
societal constitution would, for instance, be possible within the
corporate organization when two processes-an organizational and a
legal process-are combined in the codes. 49 Following this
understanding, the code of conduct then represents the top-level
commitment, which determines the corporate organization, including
strategic and financial decisions, on the one hand and the process of
internal legal control on the other hand. The codes then "link
fundamental principles of the organization with secondary legal rules."5 0
This, however, requires that the corporation's internal legal process
enjoys a high degree of autonomy from other organizational processes
within the corporate organization. In this regard, it is worth considering
potential alternatives where codes of conduct might serve as linkages
between the internal corporate organization and the law. Two
tendencies in the development of codes of conduct might in this regard
become crucial for the external stabilization.
First, corporations increasingly pursue the strategy of cooperating
with external initiatives that certify code-compliance, the Fair Labor
Association (FLA) or the Forest Stewardship (FSC) Council, among
others. Second, codes of conduct become increasingly relevant in
national law where codes of conduct are taken into account to reach a
legal decision.
Concerning the first aspect, corporate codes of conduct interact with
external civil society institutions. This makes multi-stakeholder
initiatives therefore promising candidates to serve as external
institutions constraining the internal use of the corporate codes of
conduct. A striking example is FLA, the multi-stakeholder initiative.
This multi-stakeholder initiative requires all participating companies to
reconcile the companies' internal code of conduct with the standards of
the FLA. In addition, companies are required to implement an internal
system of monitoring code compliance.51 The FLA monitors the content
of the internal code and the functioning of the internal monitoring
48. TEUBNER, supra note 4, at 106.
49. Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of 'Private" and
"Public" Corporate Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617, 624-25 (2011).
50. Id. at 625.
51. FAIR LABOR Assoc., FLA CHARTER pt. IX, at 12-13 (July 30, 2013), http://www.
fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/fla-charter-7-30-13.pdf.
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system on a continuous basis. Accordingly, the participating companies
remain autonomous in implementing the required standards and
setting up a workable system of code compliance. At the same time, they
are constrained in deviating from the FLA code if they do not want to
risk losing membership. Moreover, the independent monitoring
conducted by FLA staff and the external assessment of the companies'
internal management systems highly restrict corporations in deciding
about whether or not to comply with the code. As Larry Cati Backer
puts it in this volume with regard to the FLA: "Effectively, accredited
companies can outsource enforcement while retaining a substantial
stake in the development of both the standards to be applied and the
monitoring systems applied." Thus, in the interaction between external
multi-stakeholder programs and internal corporate codes, the
certification process of the multi-stakeholder initiatives connects the
internal self-limitative social process with a separate legal process. 52
Secondly, it is also the system of national law that still plays an
important role in externalizing and stabilizing the self-limitation. When
corporations publish their codes in their annual reports, the codes
become subject to disclosure law. The inclusion of codes of conduct into
supplier agreements makes them relevant for the field of contract law.
In all these fields, codes of conduct represent a connection between the
internal self-limitation and the external regulation by national law. The
law creates a binding effect, which resists temporary urges of the
corporation to give in to the temptation and weaken, abandon, or simply
ignore the code.
This relation between codes of conduct and national law has so far
been most prominently debated in the field of unfair commercial
practices law. In this area, a tendency can be observed how codes of
conduct are interpreted as self-limitative commitments that give rise to
legal liability if a company does not comply.53 A result of this tendency
is that the code represents not only the top-level commitment of the
corporate organization, but also the relevant legal basis to which the
law connects. The example most commonly mentioned in this context is
Kasky v. Nike Inc.54 In this case, the California Supreme Court held that
Nike could in principal be held liable under the California Unfair
52. For the legal dimension in the multi-stakeholder certification process, see generally
Jaye Ellis, Constitutionalization of Nongovernmental Certification Programs, 20 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1035 (2013); Poul F. Kjaer, Transnational Normative Orders: The
Constitutionalism of Intra- and Trans-Normative Law, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
777 (2013).
53. For the importance of unfair commercial practices law with respect to the code
development see, for example, MICHAEL KERR, RICHARD JANDA, CHIP PITrs, CORPORATE
SocIAL RESPONSIBILITY. A LEGAL ANALYSIS 476-79 (2009).
54. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
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Competition and False Advertisement Act for not complying with its
own code of conduct.5 5 The case highlights the connection between codes
of conduct as internal self-limitative rules and court decisions as a
potential external stabilizing instance. It is not the violation of
international workplace standards that is per se a violation of unfair
commercial practices law; rather, unfair commercial practices law
connects to noncompliance with the internally adapted and published
code of conduct and interprets this as a breach of the law.5 6 Hence, the
code of conduct can serve as the basis for the decision about whether the
corporation in fact acted legally or illegally. This illustrates how court
decisions foster the role of codes as "a normative basis if multinational
enterprises act improperly."5 7 It may lead to a situation where national
law respects the internally developed code of conduct as the applicable
self-limitation but takes it as part of the duties of private actors under
national law. This example indeed shows how a firm relation between
codes of conduct and national law can be established. However, due to
lack of case law on this issue in other areas, the success of national law
in serving as a external stabilizing instance is so far still uncertain.
55. Id.; see also Michelle Sutton, Between a Rock and a Judicial Hard Place: Corporate
Social Responsibility Reporting and Potential Legal Liability Under Kasky v. Nike, 72 U.
Mo. KAN. CITY SCH. L. REv. 1159, 1169-75 (2004) (outlining the preceding decisions by the
California Superior Court, the California Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court).
56. A similar interaction exists in the context of European Fair Trading Law. Pursuant to
Art. 6 (2) of the Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial
practices, a breach of unfair commercial practices law is present in the case of "non-
compliance with commitments contained in codes of conduct by which the trader has
undertaken to be bound." The effectiveness of this provision in serving as a stabilizing
instance depends, however, largely upon whether the notion "code of conduct" will be given a
broad interpretation and will also cover the codes of conduct that are discussed here. The
European Commission seems to be in favor of such a broad interpretation. See GUIDANCE ON
THE IMPLEMENTATION/APPLICATION OF THE DIRECTIVE 2005/29/EC ON UNFAIR COMMERCIAL
PRACTICES, at 44-45, SEC (2009) 1666, (Dec. 3, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
consumer-marketing/files/ucp gudance-en.pdf. But for a critical position on this broad
interpretation, see, for example, Axel Birk, Corporate Responsibility, unternehmerische
Selbstverpflichtungen und unlauterer Wettbewerb [Corporate Responsibility, Company
Self-Commitments and Unfair Competition], GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTz UND
URHEBERRECHT (GRUR) [PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS] 196, 198-201
(2011).
57. Willem van Genugten & Sophie van Bijsterveld, Codes of Conduct for
Multinational Enterprises: Useful Instruments or a Shield Against Binding Liability, 7
TILBURG FOREIGN L. REV. 161, 177 (1998) (emphasis added).
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III. TRANSNATIONAL SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM-THEORY AND
PRACTICE
Corporate codes of conduct are just one example of societal
constitutions. The goal of this special issue is to discuss various aspects
of transnational societal constitutionalism-its theory and practice in
other potential fields of application. This idea brought together legal,
political, and social science scholars to a conference in Turin in May
2012. The conference was hosted by the International University
College of Turin, the Collegio Carlo Alberto, Moncalieri, Turin, The
Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law, and Maastricht
University.
After an introductory section defining the agenda, the second
section scrutinizes the recent move of constitutionalism beyond the
nation-state. The move toward a new constitutional pluralism goes into
two different directions-the "transnational" and the "societal." The
third section deals with the spatial and temporal dimensions of the new
constitutional phenomena. In the fourth section, "constitutional
subjects," the contributions search for societal equivalents to the
political idea of "We the People," and identify transnational normative
orders, multinational corporations, and global social movements as
potential candidates. Finally, the fifth section, "constitutional arenas,"
focuses on the constitutional processes and the specific characteristics of
constitutional norms in various social fields.
A. Beyond Nation-State Constitutions: The Move to the "Transnational"
and the "Societal"
Certainly, transnational societal constitutionalism is a double
provocation for traditional constitutional theory. Identifying
constitutional phenomena on a transnational level contests the
monopoly of the nation-state constitution. Moreover, assigning to
various social sectors the capacity of generating autonomous
constitutional norms fosters a new understanding of constitutions as a
product of civil society and not solely as a matter of institutionalized
politics.
From the perspective of sociological constitutional theory,
Christopher Thornhill analyzes whether and how constitutional
processes take place on the transnational level.5 8 For him, the crucial
mechanism of constitution making is the formation of rights. In contrast
58. See generally Christopher Thornhill, A Sociology of Constituent Power: The Political
Code of Transnational Societal Constitutions, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 551 (2013).
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to traditional constitutional theory that declares constituent power to be
the ultimate point of regress, he argues for a reverse perspective and
regards constituent power as being generated by constituted power. He
analyses decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and national constitutional
courts and shows how these courts, which are rightly seen as instances
of constituted power, create new power and thus become genuine
instances of constituent power by referring to legal rights. For
Thornhill, rights reference is accordingly the pivotal factor through
which power is generated. Comparing national and transnational
constitution-making, he identifies this mechanism of rights reference on
both levels.
Yet there are also specific differences. On a transnational level,
rights reference is not only limited to the political and legal system, but
also and more frequently employed by nonpolitical and nonlegal actors.
The result is that constitution-making happens in social sectors other
than politics and law in a functional, "nationally cross-cutting fashion."
Thornhill, however, concludes that in order for these transnational
societal powers to become constituted, they need to be related to the
normative apparatus of judicial control and a political regulatory
framework.
Mattias Kumm focuses on the transnational dimension of
constitutional pluralism. Although traditional constitutional scholarship
has indeed provided rich normative ideas on the concept of legitimate
authority on the level of the nation-state, the idea of constitutionalism
still needs to be further scrutinized in light of the transnational
embedding of nation-state constitutions. This embedding results in
situations where national constitutional practice affects outsiders.
Kumm defines them as "justice-sensitive externalities." A constitutional
duty must be established for states to take into consideration these
transnational externalities of domestic constitutional practice. Yet,
these externalities need not only to be reflected in form of duties of
states. More fundamentally, the existence of these externalities also
questions the very idea of "We the People" as the fundament of
constitutional legitimacy. In Kumm's own words: "A constitution
established by 'We the People' can only claim legitimate authority over a
domain in which there are no justice-sensitive externalities."5 9
There are, however, motivational and epistemic obstacles that may
prevent an appropriate consideration of justice-sensitive externalities.
States may refuse to pay attention to them and instead focus purely on
59. See generally Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An
Integrated Conception of Public Law, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 605 (2013).
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domestic impacts of their policies. Moreover, there is no universal global
consensus on how justice may be achieved in light of these externalities.
In order to overcome these obstacles, the potentially biased externalities
perspective of national constitutional law has to be complemented by
constitutional rules of international law that states are obliged to
respect, develop, and support. It is only this constitutional system of
international law that may address justice issues related to
externalities and define the domain over which states can exercise
legitimate authority. Hence, transnational constitutional thinking needs
to focus on the interdependence of national and transnational
constitutions. The externalities need to be dealt with on a transnational
level, but they also need to be supported by an appropriate
constitutional structure on the national level.
Emilios Christodoulidis focuses on the "societal" side of
transnational constitutionalism. He critically assesses the capacity of
the economy to self constitute in the shadow of institutionalized politics
and its potential for an internal politicization. He argues that an
internal politicization of social sectors resulting from external social
pressures remains difficult to realize. Against the background of an
asymmetry between social rationalities on a transnational level with the
economic system becoming so powerful and overwhelming, political
elements in society seem to be endangered by "market capture." This is
why Christodoulidis remains sceptical about upholding the idea of
mutual systemic irritation and, as a result, also the possibility of an
autonomous politicization within economy. By describing economic
self-limitation as a functional equivalent of politics, the political
element, he submits, is in fact aligned to the functional imperative of
economic rationality. If there is a democratic element in corporate codes
of conduct, it is exploited by the corporate logic. Ethical consumerism
remains to a large extent influenced by the logic of price.
Instead, he argues for a genuinely political element generating
societal constitutions that realizes democracy and equality and works as
a normative category rather than as a functional equivalent. In other
words, the political has to be upheld against the rules of the market as
nonnegotiable. The achievements of national political economy, such as
trade unions, have to be protected against the rules of European market
integration as "an injunction against the submission of the dignity of
labour to the economic reasoning of comparative advantage."60
In the third contribution, Paul Schiff Berman focuses on the
consequences of a multitude of societal constitutions and offers a
60. See generally Emilios Christodoulidis, On the Politics of Societal Constitutionalism,
20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 629 (2013).
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concept about how to deal with constitutional plurality.6 1 Assuming that
a plurality of political and societal orders exists on a global level, he
argues that this pluralism should neither be unified nor eliminated.
Instead, constitutional diversity in transnational society is desirable,
which according to him requires developing specific mechanisms,
institutions, and principles. In particular, he suggests implementing
choice of law mechanisms that allow for deliberation and dialogue with
other societal constitutions. On the basis of several examples, Berman
illustrates where such mechanisms already work in practice. For
instance, they exist in the margin of appreciation doctrine of the
European Court of Human Rights or the composition of juries in
international courts with members of different communities.
B. Spatial and Temporal Dimensions of Societal Constitutionalism
If transnational societal constitutionalism questions the territorial
state order as the only institution capable of enacting constitutions, it
also deviates from the common understanding of the territorial and
temporal stability of constitutions. Accordingly, the dimensions of
constitutional space and time need to be further scrutinized.
Genuine transnational societal constitutions can arguably be
understood as an attempt to detach the constitution from territory. Yet,
this implies that societal constitutions will develop a more indirect
connection to territories and, even more far reaching, a rather complex
spatial dimension. In spite of societal constitutions transcending the
territorial boundaries of the nation-state, the contributions seek to
make sense of the dimensions of territory and space in a novel way.
Moreover, societal constitutionalism understands constitutions as
dynamically evolving from social spheres with a high degree of
flexibility and fluidity. Taking this into consideration, societal
constitutionalism also challenges the idea of constitutions as an
instance providing a high degree of stability over time and questions
how societal constitutionalism changes the temporal understanding in
constitutional theory.
Hans Lindahl emphasizes inclusion, exclusion, and the importance
of boundaries for the theory of societal constitutionalism. 62 He
scrutinizes the way in which societal constitutions establish boundaries,
spatial boundaries in particular. The capability of nonstate social
61. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism: Procedural
Prnciples for Managing Global Legal Pluralism, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 665
(2013).
62. See generally Hans Lindahl, We and Cyberlaw: The Spatial Unity of Constitutional
Orders, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 697 (2013).
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sectors to create autonomous orders arguably requires the existence of
boundaries, which distinguish a "we" and "the other." These boundaries
are established by a jointly acting collective with a shared normative
theme. The theme determines the personal, spatial, temporal, and
material boundaries of the order. Focusing on the "Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberlaw," Lindahl illustrates how even the
world-encompassing cyberlaw establishes spatial boundaries. Although
cyberlaw has commonly been assumed to have no spatial dimension
because it addresses everyone everywhere at every time, he argues how
spatial boundaries become visible when focusing on those excluded from
this global distribution of space.
On a more concrete level, Lindahl shows how an Islamic Somali
man's attack on a cartoonist's Muhammed cartoons was more than a
terrorist attack that took place in the territory and the legal order of the
state of Denmark. It can also be interpreted as an attack by someone
situated in an order that is spatially excluded from the Internet. In fact,
the Declaration establishes spatial boundaries by excluding any
religious order that contests having pictures of the prophet shown
anywhere. Cyberlaw accordingly represents a genuine
spatially-localizable constitutional order.
Riccardo Prandini deals with the temporal dimension of societal
constitutionalism. 63 Societal constitutions are increasingly described as
dynamic and temporal constructs that seem to be overburdened with
dealing with present social complexity. Moreover, these present
constitutional structures have neither a profound grounding in the past
nor a stable connection to the future. This is a problematic development
because binding time has always been the central function of law and
constitutions. Law must connect the past with the present to stabilize
social expectations and to make future legal-illegal behavior predictable
for social actors. Constitutions represent stable relations between
politics and law and establish time-enduring corridors for mutual
irritation between the political and the legal system. This, as a result,
allows the law to fulfill its societal function and rely on the constitution
as a highly stable input from politics.
With this analytical focus on time, Prandini identifies a core
difference between state constitutions and societal constitutions.
Societal constitutions are characterized by a high degree of
future-orientation and a simultaneous marginalization of the past. By
allowing a variety of public and private actors to contribute to the
constitutionalism project, societal constitutions get institutionalized
63. See generally Riccardo Prandini, The Future of Societal Constitutionalism in the
Age of Acceleration, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 731 (2013).
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faster. In addition, societal constitutions' strong focus on court decisions
as constitutional centers allows them to anticipate future social
consensus more rapidly than parliamentary organization. Finally, the
increasing importance of scandalization indicates how alleged human
rights violations are rendered immediately "illegal" without reverting to
past human rights jurisdiction. Together, these characteristics show
how present day societal constitutions have increasingly strengthened a
temporal connection between present and future with a high degree of
future-orientation rather than a connection between past and present
that determined the future.
C. New Constitutional Subjects: Transnational Normative Orders,
Multinational Corporations, and Global Social Movements
In the previous contributions, the authors underlined that societal
constitutionalism includes nonstate actors. Yet, it remains to be
discussed which social configurations-systems, regimes, networks,
assemblages, or organizations-are capable of becoming constitutional
subjects. The contributions in this section identify various candidates
and suggest broadening the state-centered perspective of constitutional
theory.
Poul Kjaer identifies both nation-states and transnational private
orders as normative orders that are equally important for the
emergence of societal constitutions. 64 As a noteworthy restriction, Kjaer
only acknowledges the internal formal organization of these normative
orders. In order for formal organizations to develop constitutional
structures, he argues that an internal organizational process within a
social sector has to be connected to a set of hierarchically ordered norms
and a political infrastructure. In this regard, the necessary relation to
the political can be established either by a connection to national and
international political institutions or by a connection to internal
political structures. Subsequently, the formal organization has to
delineate its own constitutional subject by mirroring its external social
environment.
The classic example is the delineation of society within the state as
the constitutional subject "the people" or "the nation." Analyzing the
FairTrade Labelling Organization (FLO) as a constitutional subject,
Kjaer illustrates this approach by interpreting the institutionalized
parliamentary-like procedure adopting and revising the FLO Charter as
an internal politicized organizational structure. A connection to a legal
process takes place as FLO is connected to the separately incorporated
64. See generally Kjaer, supra note 52.
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entity FLO-CERT, which monitors compliance and sanctions
noncompliance with the FLO Charter. The development of a genuine
constitutional subject takes place when external
stakeholders-producers, traders, and independent experts-become
mirrored in the internal organizational structures through
representatives.
Identifying multinational corporations as constitutional subjects,
Larry Catd Backer broadens this perspective.65 He defines them as
constitutional subjects in conjunction with their fractured, fluid,
permeable, and polycentric environment. He analyses how Apple Inc.
introduced self-limitative structures in order to monitor social and
environmental standards in its supply-chain. Autonomous self-limiting
structures of corporations, he argues, can only be understood if one
takes into account the dynamic social environment of their governance
unit. Corporate constitutions can be defined as "stable constitutions in
dynamic oscillation."66 Hence, corporations are dependent on constant,
but also constantly changing, external input from various sources
ranging from international politics and institutionalized
multi-stakeholder initiatives to spontaneous protests and boycotts. The
Apple example shows how the company's internal constitution,
particularly its corporate social responsibility policy and its supplier
code of conduct, developed alongside the ongoing claims for
transparency raised by NGOs and consumers, and later on in
collaboration with multi-stakeholder certification programs. As a result,
the formerly vague, partly secret, and merely nonbinding commitment
was considerably improved and implemented.
While Backer focuses on the internal organizational perspective of
multinational corporations and the internal effects of external pressure,
Gavin Anderson reverses the perspective and investigates the
constitutional potential of external pressure, more concretely, of social
movements.6 7 The lack of any institutionalized organizational structure,
their grounding in non-Western culture, and their critical potential
makes it, at first sight, difficult to include social movements in
constitutional theory, but societal constitutionalism attempts to do so
and thus represents in this regard a novelty by recognizing social actors
as constitutional subjects. Nevertheless, even societal constitutionalism,
he submits, seems so far to favor institutionalized constitutional
subjects (corporations, trade organizations). By connecting the
"globalization from below" literature to constitutional theory, Anderson
65. See generally Backer, supra note 26.
66. Id. at 858.
67. See generally Gavin W. Anderson, Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements,
and Constitutionalism from Below, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 881 (2013).
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argues for an understanding of social movements as constitutional
subjects, as inherent parts of the political, albeit in a
noninstitutionalized, unordered way.
To make sense of social movements as constitutional subjects,
constitutional theory needs to undergo a fundamental transformation,
since social movements transcend the traditional political dichotomy of
reform and revolution. They seek neither to seize nor to abandon power,
but rather they seek to change the power relations as such. In order to
capture this specific characteristic in the constitutional discourse,
Anderson suggests nodal governance as a framework for constitutional
theory, in which different nodes act within a plurality of networks and
may be connected to each other without a need for these nodes to be
formally institutionalized.
D. Constitutional Arenas
How does societal constitutionalism function in practice? What
conditions have to be fulfilled in order to define a social process as a
constitutional development? And what do the specifics of each of these
different constitutional processes imply for the further development of
the theory? The authors in this section choose specific case studies to
show where constitutional processes in global society can be observed
and which conclusions for societal constitutionalism can be drawn. They
identify constitutional processes in various fields: societally crafted
regimes of intellectual property, international financial account
standard-setting, the commons movement, the regime of fundamental
rights, and the certification programs for sustainable forestry and
fishery.
In the field of intellectual property (IP), Dan Wielsch identifies
constitutional processes in what he calls societally crafted IP regimes
generated by private actors and draws conclusions for the future of IP
law.68 Wielsch argues that, while the present international IP regime
constituted under the World Trade Organization (WTO)/Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) trade regime
extensively protects the economic exploitation of intellectual property by
the author, other social interests relevant for IP rights, become
remarkably underrepresented. This, however, seems highly problematic
because decentralized knowledge production is pivotal for any social
order. In order to overcome this deficit in international IP law, Wielsch
argues that IP law, instead of autonomously constructing the institution
68. See generally Dan Wielsch, Private Governance of Knowledge: Societally-Crafted
Intellectual Properties Regimes, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 907 (2013).
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of property along economic logic, should focus on decentralized social
knowledge production and on the relation between the rights of the
author and society's right to access in particular. Wielsch sees the way
forward in alternative models of knowledge production initiated by
private actors, such as copyleft or standard license agreements.
Alternative IP models occupy the legal form of existing IP rights but
employ them for a different mode of knowledge production. Alternative
IP models subordinate existing IP rights under their own community
standards and social conventions and hereby render possible a
communicative process of knowledge generation that restricts the
economic dominance of IP rights. More concretely, Wielsch shows how
authors open their IP rights to a broader community via standard
license agreements, but they can only do so under the condition that any
follow-up products are again licensed under the community rules. Such
alternative models of knowledge production that employ IP rights, but
transform them according to the needs of shared knowledge production,
may prevent the dominance of economic rationality in IP law.
Moritz Renner analyses international financial accounting
standards.6 9 He interprets societal constitutionalism as a process in
which the system at stake is closely coupled to the legal and political
system. For him, societal constitutionalism attempts to combine central
elements of two theory traditions-social-democratic economic
democracy and ordo-liberal economic constitutionalism. In international
financial accounting standards, Renner sees both constitutive and
limitative rules evolving. The former can be identified in the evolving
hierarchy of norms. The central document of the International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) contains rules about how the
standards can be adopted, changed, and implemented. These standards
become hierarchically connected to national law as European disclosure
law refers to them as the applicable standard. The limitative element in
transnational accounting standards is represented in the interrelations
between this legal process of international accounting and the political
system, which is established primarily by means of a stakeholder
consultation phase in the standard-setting process.
Saki Bailey and Ugo Mattei analyze constitutional processes
initiated and driven by social movements. 70 Employing insights from
critical constitutional theory and practical experience from the Italian
commons movements-the social movement against privatization of
public services-they argue that social movements may indeed become a
69. See generally Moritz Renner, Occupy the System! Societal Constitutionalism and
Transnational Corporate Accounting, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 941 (2013).
70. See generally Saki Bailey & Ugo Mattei, Social Movements as Constituent Power:
The Italian Struggle for the Commons, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 965 (2013).
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constitutional counter force against the hegemonic project of economic
constitutionalism. In a first step, they describe how, in the history of
modern liberal constitutions, the paradox of constituent power-its
double character as the constitutionally determined "people"
presupposing and being institutionalized in the constitution and as the
"raw" power preceding and enacting a constitution-has become
concealed by an emphasis on the former character and its autonomous
institutionalization. As an important development of this process,
private property has become embedded into the constitutional structure,
resulting in an incontestable institution beyond the reach of
institutionalized constituent power. To render the institution of private
property constitutionally contestable, Bailey and Mattei look to the
deinstitutionalized element of constituent power in the form of social
movements.
The Italian referendum against privatization of the public service of
water supply shows how a broad civil society coalition consisting of
scholars, political activists, cultural institutions, and environmental
groups successfully initiated a constitutional referendum that resulted
in the privatization of the water supply against the will of national
politicians and the pressure of the European Union institutions. While
Bailey and Mattei consider this as a successful instance of societal
constitutionalism from below, they also realize that this success
requires the commons movement to become subject to a
self-constitutionalizing process.
Florian Rodl deals with fundamental rights in societal
constitutionalism.7 1 Fundamental rights may in fact serve as a societal
constitutional category that is explicitly not limited to politics and
public law but is inherent to private law. From the perspective of moral
philosophy, Rdd1 perceives private law as the core of societal
constitutionalism and focuses in particular on the relation between
private law and democratic rights. Democratic rights are indispensable
for the functioning of a political order and thus also for enacting private
law; they can be understood as legitimizing private law. Since the
democratic parliamentary process in turn presupposes a society
constituted by fundamental rights to be legitimate itself, the political
process logically presupposes a societal understanding of fundamental
rights. Fundamental rights then represent societal institutions with the
result that private law becomes genuine constitutional law. In relation
to the transnational constellation, this requires an understanding of
fundamental rights as universal in substance and not limited to any
71. See generally Florian Rodl, Fundamental Rights, Private Law, and Societal
Constitution: On the Logic of the So-Called Horizontal Effect, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 1015 (2013).
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specific national public order; rather, fundamental rights have to be
conceptualized within private law itself irrespective of what the
national constitution prescribes. Rbdl emphasizes that this concept
would not only require state courts, but also require nonstate court-like
institutions such as commercial arbitration or the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) disputes to understand
fundamental rights as private law rights.
In the final contribution, Jaye Ellis examines certification programs
for sustainable fishery and forestry as a form of societal
constitutionalism in the interrelation between different social fields,
namely economics, politics, ethics, science, and law. 72 While
acknowledging their different rationalities as important for these
certification programs to form a constitutional network, she emphasizes
the risks of such close interrelations. They may jeopardize the autonomy
of each of these rationalities, which, as a consequence, may seriously
endanger the functioning of the network as such. Hence, societal
constitutionalism requires not only connecting different rationalities,
but also establishing mechanisms within the network that safeguard
the autonomy of each of the rationalities at stake.
In her case study on certification programs, Ellis critically observes
how the law's rationality, albeit being a crucial component in the
process of self-limitation, is currently in great danger of being
overwhelmed by other rationalities due to the incentive-based market
structure of product certification and the scientific evidence on which
the decision on issuing the certificate is based. She diagnoses the cause
for this lack of legal autonomy in the tendency toward enacting vague
principles instead of hard norms. Quite comparable to the
materialization of the law in the welfare state, the legal rationality in
the programs becomes unacceptably dependent on other social
rationalities. As a way out, Ellis suggests that the certification
programs would have to enact "stop-rules" that may safeguard the
autonomy of the law against political, scientific, or economic
domination.
Together, these contributions can be read as ideas on how the theory
of societal constitutionalism could be further developed and as
instructive illustrations as to where societal constitutions already
emerge in today's world society.
72. See generally Ellis, supra note 52.
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